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1 Introduction
In the social world, size distributions tend to be asymmetric and leptokurtic. The distri-
bution of earnings is a leading practical example of this attitude. Indeed, earlier studies
on the subject (e.g. Lydall, 1968 and Harrison, 1981) discovered a number of empirical
regularities that are found in all observed distributions of large populations. Specifi-
cally, earnings distributions are positively skewed and have a “fat” right tail, or, otherwise
stated, the mean usually exceeds the median and the top percentiles of earners account
for a conspicuous share of the total. These stylized facts are relevant for a variety of
reasons, mostly because they affect inequality positively (Maasoumi and Theil, 1979).
Economic theory has proposed various explanations of the observed regularities.1 A
vast literature considers the returns to human capital investment and the related issue of
skill-biased technological change as decisive factors in shaping the distribution of labour
earnings (see e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 1998, Acemoglu, 2002, Moore and Ranjan,
2005 and Lemieux, 2006). Others studies place more emphasis on institutional features,
such as the role of unions in the wage-setting process and the degree of centralization
and coordination in wage bargaining (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998;
Kahn, 2000; Barth and Lucifora, 2006). Economic openness has also been viewed as a
factor affecting the observed patterns of earnings inequality (Wood, 1994; Leamer, 1995;
Acemoglu, 2002; Anderson, 2005). Finally, changes in the composition of workforce (as
a result of the shift in employment from manufacturing to services, population aging,
increased participation of women, and so on) as well as labour market conditions (country-
specific supply and demand factors, market rigidities, etc.) can clearly contribute to define
the earnings distribution structure (Bertola and Ichino, 1995; Gregg and Manning, 1997;
Moore and Ranjan, 2005).
In Italy, the research literature has principally focused on two possible determinants
of earnings distribution: the composition of employment and the institutional framework.
As regards the first issue, some studies have paid explicit attention to the increasing
role of self-employment as a specific feature of the Italian workforce. For instance, Torrini
(2005, 2006) and Rani (2008) found that in Italy self-employment accounts for a substan-
tial share of total labour force with respect to other developed countries and emphasized
its importance in accounting for inequality.2
For what concerns institutional factors, the past two decades have witnessed some
very important reform experiences which have been influencing the recent trend of Italy’s
labour market.3 Key among them were the 1993 reform of the bargaining system and the
measures aimed at improving labour market flexibility.
The bargaining pattern set out in 1993 consists of a first level nation-wide sectoral
bargaining and a second level of bargaining decentralised at regional or firm level. While
national contracts are expected to set the minimum wage and preserve the purchasing
power of workers, decentralised bargaining should be devoted to distribute productivity
and/or profitability gains. Second-level bargaining, however, is not compulsory and it can
1In the following we pay explicit attention to the distribution of labour earnings, interchangeably
referred to as “wages” or “incomes”.
2Most recently, this finding has also been maintained by the OECD (2011, p. 3): «Changes in self-
employment income were important drivers of increased earnings inequality: their share in total earned
income has increased by 10% since the mid-1980s, and self-employment income seems more predominant
among high earners, to the contrary of many other OECD countries».
3For a discussion of the main reform measures implemented in Italy since the early 1990s and how
they have impacted on the labour market outcomes we refer the reader to Schindler (2009).
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not define wages lower than the national minimum. This has limited to some extent the
use of decentralised bargaining and resulted in a wage distribution more compressed than
it was expected (see e.g. Casadio, 2003, Checchi and Pagani, 2005 and Dell’Aringa and
Pagani, 2007).4
With regards to the pursuit of labour market efficiency, legislative measures specifi-
cally directed at fostering flexibility have been undertaken via the increase of the so-called
atypical or non-standard forms of employment, while leaving the regulation of existing em-
ployment relations largely unchanged. Despite substantial improvements in employment
rates, this has led to a strong segmentation of the Italian labour market, where highly
protected and well-paid open-end jobs coexist along with risky and low-paid temporary
occupations. The shift towards non-standard forms of work could exacerbate existing
earnings inequality, as wage differentials between standard and non-standard forms of
employment widen.5
Drawing from these recent labour market developments, in the present work we provide
new empirical evidence on the distribution of earnings in Italy. The analysis is conducted
with the data of the Participation Labour Unemployment Survey (PLUS), a sample survey
on the Italian labour market supply carried out by ISFOL6 for the years 2005, 2006, 2008
and 2010. Despite its limited time span, this dataset may be useful to pin down the role
that alternative sources of labour earnings play as determinants of income distribution and
inequality among workers, particularly for the special emphasis given to the investigation
of atypical contracts.
Relying on this source of data, we find that the empirical distribution in any one
year is highly skewed to the right, so that the proportion of workers earning more than
the modal wage is larger than the proportion of those earning less. The “fat” and long
tail on the right of the observed distributions also points to the existence of a relatively
4Traditional wage-setting institutions like collective bargaining affect workers predominantly at the
bottom or middle of the wage distribution. By contrast, wage-setting mechanisms of high executives
(the “working rich”) concern workers at the very top of the distribution. The importance of executive
compensations to explain the rise in top income shares during the last quarter of the twentieth century
has been a standard result in all the studies analysing income concentration within the top groups in
Anglo-Saxon countries. A tentative explanation explored by Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006, but see also
Lemieux et al., 2007 and Lemieux, 2008) is that the growth in performance-related schemes that affect the
compensation of high executives and the change in social norms regarding inequality and the acceptability
of very high wages have removed some implicit barriers to the rise of incomes for the very highest earners.
However, the surge experienced by top incomes in continental Europe and other advanced countries like
Japan has been small relative to existing estimates for English-speaking countries, and even the results for
Italy are fairly modest. Nevertheless, the Italian experience shows a persistent increasing pattern in top
income shares since the mid-1980s, mainly driven by top wages and self-employment income (Alvaredo
and Pisano, 2010).
5See Rani (2008) for an attempt to assess the extent to which changes in employment patterns are
associated with the rise in income inequality observed over the past two decades in the majority of
countries. With regard to wage differentials between temporary and permanent workers in the Italian
case, a quantitative appraisal of the phenomenon can be found in Picchio (2006), Cutuli (2008) and Lucidi
and Raitano (2009).
6The Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL) is a research
institute connected to the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and member of the Italian National
Statistical System (SISTAN). The PLUS survey is included in the Italian National Statistical Programme
(NSP), the SISTAN tool for planning statistical activity of public interest. For a collection of various
research results on the Italian labour market conducted by ISFOL using this dataset, see Mandrone and
Radicchia (2006).
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small number of very well-paid individuals, a fact that is confirmed by a mean wage ex-
ceeding the median. Since this pattern is likely to impact on the inequality of labour
market outcomes, we undertake a more-in-depth investigation by considering how much
of the dispersion in earnings concentrated in different parts of the distribution (“rich”
and “non-rich”) might be accounted for by alternative sources of labour income. To this
end, a “nested” decomposition of the Theil inequality measure by population subgroups
and income sources is performed. The results seem to corroborate recent findings point-
ing to a deterioration in the Italian labour market situation due to the widening gap
between the incomes of employees and self-employed and the increased job precarious-
ness. Indeed, in all the years examined we observe significant positive contributions to
within- and between-group components of total inequality arising from self-employment
revenues, which results to be more highly concentrated (and thus responsible for the in-
equality level) in the upper end of the distribution. This trend combines with the effects
exerted by income from standard employment, which instead appears more concentrated
in the bulk. Earnings from non-standard forms of work, in turn, have seen their shares of
both the total population and income increasing over time, thus arising as an important
feature of the contemporary workplace.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in
the study and outlines the approach to estimating observed distributions and the implied
amount of inequality. Section 3 presents the results of the analysis. Section 4 summarizes
the paper.
2 Data and methods
2.1 The data
The PLUS survey consists of four waves of data conducted in 2005, 2006, 2008 and
2010 on around 38,000 individuals—of which 16,000 workers of both public and private
sectors—belonging to the Italian population aged 18–64.7 Complementary to other key
national statistical sources,8 the core objective of PLUS is that of providing reliable es-
timates of rare and only marginally explored labour market issues. In particular, it is
devoted to the study of the distribution of contract types (employee/self-employed status
and their articulated subclassifications), job search activity, young and women employ-
ment participation, old-age activity and retirement choice, pattern of education and other
training, intergenerational dynamics, etc. Some of the key prerogatives of the PLUS sur-
vey that seem worthwhile highlighting here are as follows:
i) it is planned with the chief purpose of providing accurate estimates of very small-
scale phenomena, in that it allows to produce consistent evaluations of population
aggregates of about 100,000 individuals with a coefficient of variation lower than
7The age range was 15–64 for the 2005 wave. Furthermore, starting with the 2006 wave, a panel
section consisting of a large number of observations (about 65%) was additionally provided.
8In Italy, information on labour market characteristics can be obtained from various sources.
Two prominent examples are the Labour Force Survey (LFS, http://www.istat.it/en/archive/
36394), conducted quarterly by the National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), and the Work Histo-
ries Italian Panel (WHIP, http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip/whip_datahouse.php?lingua=
eng&pagina=home), built from a sample of microdata from the administrative archives of the National
Institute of Social Security (INPS). However, while the former considers the household as sampling unit,
the latter includes microdata on private sector employees only.
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10% (for example, the contract type composition of Italian total employment is
annually estimated at a degree of desegregation that allows reliable analyses of fixed-
term/atypical job distribution);9
ii) consistent labour income variables are derived through the implementation of appro-
priate techniques in the questionnaire design (e.g. with differentiation of the inter-
view submission process by type of worker), consolidation of respondents loyalty (for
panel units), and thorough data processing (multiple data check and imputation);
iii) only survey respondents are included (absence of proxy interviews), reducing in this
way the extent of measurement errors and partial non-responses.
The variable chosen for the analysis is the monthly “gross income” normalized on annual
basis earned by workers classified according to the following categories: standard full-
time workers with open-ended contracts, self-employed and atypical workers—this latter
category including workers with fixed-term contracts and other non-standard jobs.10 This
variable is in current year euros (¤), and we use the consumer price index for the whole
nation (NIC) based on the year 1995 in order to obtain distributions of “real” income.11
Furthermore, because of the complex sampling design of the PLUS survey, data make
use troughout the analysis of appropriate sampling weights to produce representative
estimates and correct standard errors and statistical tests.12
2.2 Modelling the Italian labour income distribution
As we have said, one of the main objectives of this paper is to determine how much of the
dispersion in earnings concentrated in different parts of the distribution may be accounted
for by alternative sources of labour income. For this purpose we shall distinguish in the
following between two groups of high- and low-income earners, or “rich” and “non-rich”, the
divide being represented by the minimum possible income in the classical Pareto (1895,
1896, 1897a,b) distribution
F (x) = 1−
(
x
xmin
)−α
, xmin ≤ x <∞, xmin, α > 0, (1)
which is usually considered as a good approximation of the distribution of incomes among
the rich and the moderately rich.13 In order to avoid imposing an arbitrary threshold
above which the Pareto relationship (1) is valid, the lowest income xmin is estimated from
the data by adopting a numerical technique proposed by Clauset et al. (2007, 2009) that
9See e.g. Corsetti and Mandrone (2010) and Mandrone and Marocco (2012) for applications related
to this issue.
10Non-standard jobs include economically dependent jobs, i.e. “legally autonomous” but “semi-
dependent” jobs. The workers performing these jobs depend on a single employer for their income, are
subject to compulsory daily presence, use employer’s equipment and perform the same tasks as some of
their fellows. They are contractually treated as “professional” workers, but any specific skills, professional
knowledge or competence is actually needed.
11The series of the NIC index is publicly available on the ISTAT’s website at the address http:
//www.istat.it/it/files/2011/02/indici_nazionali_nic_tuttilivaggr.xls.
12The expansion weights coming with the PLUS survey are calibrated using GREG estimation (Deville
and Särndal, 1992), which guarantees reduction of sample selection bias, small estimation variance and
large consistency with the standard labour market indicators derivable from the ISTAT’s LFS survey.
13An extensive historical survey of the use of the Pareto distribution in the context of income and
wealth distributions can be found e.g. in Arnold (1983).
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is based on minimizing the “distance” between the Pareto model and the empirical data.
The fundamental idea behind this method is simple: we choose the estimate of xmin that
makes the probability distributions of the measured data and the best-fit Pareto model
as similar as possible above xˆmin. Specifically, for each xmin we first obtain the estimate
of the shape parameter α over the data x ≥ xmin by using the conditional maximum
likelihood estimator introduced by Hill (1975)
αˆH =
[
1
m
m−1∑
i=1
(lnxn−i+1 − lnxn−m+1)
]−1
, (2)
where m = n − k + 1 is the number of extreme sample values above the threshold, n is
the sample size and k is the rank of the order statistic xn−m+1, and then compute the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) goodness-of-fit statistic
D = max
x≥xmin
∣∣∣Fˆ (x)− F (x;xmin, αˆH)∣∣∣ (3)
between the empirical cumulative distribution of the data points being fit, Fˆ (x), and
the theoretical Pareto cumulative distribution function with parameters xmin and αˆH, i.e.
F (x;xmin, αˆH). Our optimal estimate of the lower bound, xˆ∗min, is then the value of xmin
where D attains its minimum, from which we infer the optimal sample fraction, m∗, and
the optimal estimate of the shape parameter, αˆ∗H.
Once the parameters have been estimated, by exploiting the asymptotic distribution
theory of the Hill estimator (2) we calculate the standard error of the shape parameter
as αˆ
∗
H√
m∗ (e.g. Lux, 1996), whereas the uncertainty in the estimate for xmin is derived by
making use of a nonparametric bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). That is,
given our n measurements, we generate a synthetic dataset by drawing a new sequence
of points xi, i = 1, . . . , n, uniformly at random from the original data. Using the method
described above, we then estimate xmin for this surrogate dataset. By taking the standard
deviation of all the estimates over a large number of repetitions of this process,14 we can
quantify our uncertainty in the original estimated parameter.
Finally, we also perform a K-S goodness-of-fit test of the Pareto distribution for the
observations above xˆ∗min by generating a p-value that quantifies the plausibility of the hy-
pothesized model.15 In detail, our procedure is as follows. First, we fit our empirical data
to the Pareto model using the method described above and calculate the K-S statistic (3)
for this fit. Next, we generate a large number of synthetic datasets havingm∗ observations
randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter α and lower bound xmin
equal to those of the distribution that best fits the observed data. We fit each synthetic
dataset individually to the Pareto distribution and calculate the K-S statistic for each one
relative to its own model.16 Then we simply count what fraction of the time the resulting
14In practice, we perform 100 such bootstrap samplings.
15One of the features of the K-S statistic is that its distribution is known for datasets truly drawn from
any given distribution. This allows one to write down an explicit expression in the limit of large n for
the p-value. Unfortunately, this expression is only correct so long as the underlying distribution is fixed
(see e.g. Stephens, 1986). If, as in our case, the underlying distribution is itself determined by fitting to
the data and hence varies from one dataset to the next, we can not use this approach, which is why the
Monte Carlo procedure described here is instead recommended.
16Note crucially that for each synthetic dataset we compute the K-S statistic relative to the best-fit
Pareto model for that dataset, not relative to the original distribution from which the dataset was drawn.
In this way we ensure that we are performing for each synthetic dataset the same calculation that we
performed for the real dataset, a crucial requirement if we wish to get an unbiased estimate of the p-value.
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statistic is larger than the value for the empirical data. This fraction is the p-value for the
fit, and can be interpreted in the standard way: if it is larger than the chosen significance
level, then the difference between the empirical data and the model can be attributed to
statistical fluctuations alone; if it is smaller, the model is not a plausible fit to the data.
2.3 The inequality decomposition analysis
With regard to the inequality analysis, the methodology we shall follow is based on a nested
procedure of decomposition of the Theil (1967) index that combines into a simultaneous
approach the standard decompositions by population subgroups (which separates total
inequality in within- and between-group components) and income sources (which divides
overall inequality into proportional factor contributions).
Despite the Gini-based multidecomposition of inequality proposed by Mussard (2004),
the choice of the Theil index as the reference measure of inequality is motivated by two
main reasons: i) it allows perfect (subgroups) decomposability17 and ii) satisfies the
fundamental property of uniform addition for source-based decomposition.18 A third,
not trivial, advantage is given by its simple and very “smart” structure. More precisely,
it is derivable as a linear function of three basic elements: (pseudo-)Theil subindices of
inequality (for groups and income sources), population shares and income shares. In
other words, it allows to separate “size” and “spread” determinants of inequality both at
the subgroup and income source level through the explicit reference to aggregates with
political and economic relevance.
As shown in the Appendix, we can enclose into a unified framework the standard
subpopulation and income source decompositions by deriving the following (weighted)
bidimensional formulation of the Theil index
T (Y ) =
M∑
m=1
[
K∑
k=1
Pk
µmk(w)
µ(w)
ln
µk(w)
µ(w)
]
+
M∑
m=1
{
K∑
k=1
Pk
µk(w)
µ(w)
[
nk∑
i=1
pi
ymik
µk(w)
ln
yik
µk(w)
]}
=
M∑
m=1
Tbw (m) +
M∑
m=1
Tww (m)
= Tbw + Tww,
(4)
where pi represents the individual weight,19 Pk is the sum of the sample weights pi (i =
1, . . . , nk) for group k, while µ(w), µk(w) and µmk(w) are, respectively, the weighted means for
the total, kth subgroup and mth source of the kth subgroup distributions.20 Expression (4)
implicitly defines the pseudo-Theil of the Y m distribution, Tw (m) = Tbw (m)+Tww (m),
17See e.g. Cowell (1980a,b) and Shorrocks (1984).
18Following Morduch and Sicular (2002), a rule of factor decomposition satisfies the property of uniform
addition if it registers strictly negative contributions to overall inequality for any income component
equally distributed and positive. In this regard, Podder (1993) claims that «it is reasonable to think the
addition of a constant to all incomes leading to a reduction in inequality if we accept relative measures».
See also Shorrocks (1982, 1983) and Paul (2004) on this issue.
19The weights are proportional to the actual population of the strata from which the sample observa-
tions are drawn from. In the PLUS survey, strata are defined by region, type of city (metropolitan/not
metropolitan), age (5 classes), sex and employment status (employed, unemployed, student, retired, other
inactive/housewife). A detailed description of the sampling design and strategy of the survey is contained
in Giammatteo (2009).
20Notice that when the unweighted formulation is adopted we simply have pi = 1nk and Pk =
nk
n .
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i.e. the absolute contribution to total inequality of the component m. It is important
to observe that Tw (m) does not measure the m source inequality,21 as incomes in total
and partial distributions have different ranks and the weights are those corresponding to
the total distribution. Note also that while the global index T (Y ) is always positive,
the generic absolute contribution Tw (m) can assume both positive and negative values.
Hereafter, we shall use the expression of inequality increasing (decreasing) source for the
income component showing a positive (negative) value of Tw (m). Similarly, we can define
Tbw (m) as the generic m source contribution to between-group inequality (“between-group
pseudo-Theil”) and Tww (m) as the m source contribution to within-group inequality
(“within-group pseudo-Theil”).
The bidimensional decomposition (4) provides a wider set of possible inequality de-
terminants than those that would be obtained by applying separated decompositions. In
particular, we are able to distinguish among positive and negative subeffects on within-
and between-group inequality components independently on the sign of the overall source
contributions. More precisely:
i) standard subgroup decomposition provides aggregated within and between compo-
nents of total inequality declining any information on additional source-based deter-
minants;
ii) simple income source decompositions fail to distinguish in which way total income
subcomponents affect total inequality through (equalising or not equalising) effects
within subpopulations or between them.
The nested approach enforces both the subpopulation and income source decompositions,
also representing a useful instrument for the analysis of the inequality consequences of
specific government policies (transfers or tax programs, labour market reforms, etc.).22
3 Empirical results
Using the data and methods described earlier, in this section we fit the classical Pareto
model (1) to the upper tail of the Italian labour income distributions and analyze the
extent to which the level of inequality within and between the two groups that we consider,
respectively, as “the rich” and “the non-rich” is affected by earnings accruing from different
sources.
3.1 The size distribution of labour earnings in Italy
The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that the Pareto distributional assumption may
be appropriate in our case.
[Table 1 about here.]
21The mth source inequality is, instead, given by Tm = 1n
n∑
i=1
ymi
µm
ln
ymi
µm
.
22Simpler but less precise approaches are given by: i) analyses of the relation between inequality and
public policies through the use of dispersion graphs between inequality indices and country expenditures
for social security (see Beblo and Knaus, 2001); ii) pre- and post-transfer inequality computations in
order to assign factor contributions as relative difference between the two values (see Keane and Prasad,
2002, and Förster et al., 2003). As emphasized by Lerman (1999), the latter approach «may lead to
misleading results».
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Indeed, there are two noticeable features. First, the labour income distribution in any one
year displays statistically significant evidence for skewness. This can also be inferred by
looking at the difference between median and mean income, the former being consistently
lower than the latter in each year. Second, the level of kurtosis is significantly above the
normal threshold in any one of the years concerned, hinting to the presence of a thick
upper tail.
The Pareto diagrams shown in panel (c) of Figures 1 through 4 reveal the extent of
what suggested by the table above. These diagrams are plots of the annual gross income
x, charted on a logarithmic scale, against the complementary cumulative distribution of
individuals with annual gross income greater than or equal to x (also on a log scale). The
distinctive feature of distributions that follow the Pareto model in the upper tail—i.e.
the approximate linearity above some lower bound of their complementary cumulative
distributions plotted on a double logarithmic scale—is clearly evident when examining
these graphs, and we can therefore apply the estimation method discussed in Section 2 to
make a stronger case for the Pareto hypothesis.
The results of fitting the Pareto distribution to each of the years of data are summa-
rized in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
As can be seen, the model fit varied slightly across years but was generally excellent.
This is demonstrated first by the precision of the parameter estimates. All t-ratios were
indeed significant at the 0.1% level and relatively large—for example, the smallest t-ratio
for any estimate of xmin was slightly less than 4 and was typically at least 7 times larger
for α. Excellent goodness of fit is also demonstrated by the complementary cumulative
distribution plots shown in panel (c) of Figures 1 to 4, where the Pareto model (solid line)
exhibits a remarkable agreement with the data in the upper tail of the distributions, even
when the latter gets quite noisy (as, for example, in 2008).
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
Furthermore, a look at the Hill plots displayed in panel (b) of the same figures confirms
that this model is a good match to the data, since beyond the cut-off income values used
the estimates of the shape parameter appear roughly stable.23
As a more objective indication of the suitability of the Pareto model, Table 2 reports
for each wave the K-S statistic that yields the best fit to the tail data (dashed line in
panel (a) of Figures 1–4) and the Monte Carlo p-value for the goodness-of-fit test. Notice
how all p-values are very close to unity, meaning that in all cases our data can be firmly
considered to follow the Pareto distribution in the upper tail. This is confirmed by visual
inspection of the Pareto Q-Q plots of the sample quantiles above xˆ∗min, shown in panel (d)
23The so-called “Hill plot” is a visual diagnostic tool charting the Hill estimate of the shape parameter
αˆH for each xmin. The idea is to visually identify a region where the plot levels off, representing a stable
estimate of α, and then choose xmin as the beginning of that region (see e.g. Beirlant et al., 2004).
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of the figures.24 As it can be seen, every plot lies extremely close to the reference line,
and much closer than is typically observed in plots of this type.
It must also be noticed that the size of the group here considered as “the rich” shrank
dramatically in 2010. Indeed, based on the results reported in Table 2, the optimal
number of tail observations used in the estimation of the Pareto distribution showed in
that year a decline by approximately 70% with respect to 2008, while in contrast only few
significant changes are detected in the preceding years. This is a probable consequence of
the economic crisis started in 2008–2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis, which
caused a fall in real mean and median income of about 2% between 2008 and 2010 (see
Table 1). This hypothesis seems also confirmed by the results of a relative distribution
analysis, which allows for a decomposition of the relative income density between 2008 and
2010 so as to isolate changes occurred along the entire income range due to differences
in the first moment.25 Indeed, from inspection of Figure 5 one can see that the mean
downshift between 2008 and 2010 impacted the whole range of the income distribution
with varying intensity, affecting more negatively the mass of workers above the 2008
median.
[Figure 5 about here.]
More specifically, the figure displays a decline of the mass in the upper tail above the
70th percentile and a relatively small increase in the upper-median range of the share of
workers between approximately the 65th and the 70th percentile of the 2008 distribution,
thus indicating a clear convergence of higher incomes toward the center.26
3.2 Results from inequality decomposition
Having provided strong evidence for the presence of a Pareto tail in the Italian labour
income distribution, we now turn to assessing earnings inequality through decomposition
exercises. The situation is summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
24Since a log-transformed Pareto random variable is exponentially distributed, the coordinates of the
points on a Pareto Q-Q plot follow immediately from the exponential case by taking the transformation
ln Xxmin ∼ Exp (α).
25For our purposes, the “relative distribution” is defined as the ratio of the income density in the
comparison year (2010) to the income density in the reference year (2008) evaluated at each quantile of
the reference distribution, and can be interpreted as the fraction of the comparison population that fall
in each quantile of the reference population. This allows us to identify and locate the changes that have
occurred in the entire Italian labour income distribution between the two years. In particular, when the
fraction of individuals in a quantile is higher (lower) than the fraction in the reference year, the relative
distribution will be higher (lower) than 1. Where there is no change, the relative distribution will be flat
at the value 1. Furthermore, this approach also allows to decompose the relative density into changes in
location and changes in shape, in order to emphasize differences between the comparison and the reference
populations that could be attributed to a change in the average (or median) income or to changes of the
shape (including differences in variation, skewness and other distributional characteristics). We refer the
reader to Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) for a more formal definition of the relative distribution.
26Alternative indices like the median can be considered. The corresponding results do not differ in a
significant way and are not reported here.
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Table 3 contains for each wave of data standard distributional measures, such as
population and income shares and relative means. Standard employees represented in
each year around 65% of total population and received on average 60% of total income.
From 2005 to 2010, self-employed decreased both their population and income shares,
while atypical workers followed a reversed trend until 2008. As regards the relative mean,
for standard employees it ranges between 90% in 2005 and 98% in 2010; for self-employed
the percentage increased from 148% in 2005 to 155% in 2008, whereas in 2010 it decreased
to 132%; finally, the mean of atypical workers relative to that of the whole population
was around 68% over the whole period.
By considering the subgroups made up of individuals with income < xˆ∗min (“non-rich”)
and ≥ xˆ∗min (“rich”), we observe that: i) the population and income shares of the non-rich
decreased between 2005 and 2008 and increased in 2010; ii) this evidence is reversed for
the rich group; iii) the relative mean income of each group was fairly stable until 2008
(slightly over 70% for the non-rich and more than 200% for the rich) and raised in 2010,
notably for the rich.
Table 3 also shows the estimates and corresponding standard errors for both the Theil
and Gini measures of inequality. The Theil index for total gross income grew from 0.249
in 2005 to 0.269 in 2010, save for a temporary decrease in 2006. The estimated Gini
exhibited a similar pattern until 2008, while in 2010 it stayed the same as in 2005. As
depicted in Figure 6, the two indices reveal sharp inequality heterogeneity both at the
population subgroup and income source levels.
[Figure 6 about here.]
In particular, self-employed and atypical earning distributions are characterized by high
levels of income disparities. However, it is worthwhile to underline that either the ranks
and changes of the inequality measured by the two indices are always consistent across
the years, thus suggesting robustness of our findings.
Table 4 presents the results of the standard and “nested” Theil decomposition by
subgroups (“rich” and “non-rich”) and labour income sources (standard, self-employed
and atypical). For each wave: i) the rows “Within” and “Between” indicate how much
of the income source contributions (columns) can be imputed to intra- or inter-groups
differences; ii) the rows labeled “Non-rich” and “Rich” specify how the incomes in the lower
and upper parts of the annual distributions affect each of the above two components; iii)
the “Source dec.” row displays the income source contributions resulting from the standard
decomposition rule. Because of the additive property of equation (4), the absolute values
sum up both vertically and horizontally; the percent values are calculated with respect to
total inequality (“Source dec.”) as well as “Within” and “Between” components.
The within-group component of labour income inequality increased from more than
47% in 2005 to around 55% in 2008, while it reduced in 2010. The standard decomposition
by income sources highlights the fundamental role played by self-employed in shaping total
income inequality, even though their relative impact decreased steadily from 112% to less
than 68%. The contribution due to income from standard work was slightly negative in
2005 and positive in the following three waves. In particular, at the end of the observed
period it reached a significant value of about 37%. Income stemming from atypical work
made marked negative contributions in 2005 and 2006, while in the following two waves
it decreased on average by 5%.
The contribution to overall inequality of standard incomes shifted from negative to
positive as a consequence of a weaker inequality-decreasing effect of the between-group
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component (from around -22% in 2005 to approximately -1% in 2008) and, only in 2010,
because of the strong increase of the within-group inequality share (about 77%). Moreover,
the nested procedure allows us to impute most of this result to the inequality-increasing
contribution (nearly 23%) arising among the rich. Self-employed inequality contribution
fell over time as a result of decreasing positive effects of both within- and between-group
components referred to the rich group. Finally, with regards to the atypical workers we
observe a nearly generalised negative contribution, apart from a few but significant excep-
tions. In particular, the rich incomes accounted for positive between-group contributions
over the entire period analysed, whereas for the within-group inequality this is true only
starting with the 2008 wave.
4 Summary
In this paper we have examined the distribution of labour earnings in Italy using four
waves of data from the Participation Labour Unemployment Survey (PLUS), a sample
survey on the Italian labour market supply. The main results are twofold.
First, we have found that the shape of the Italian labour income distribution in any
one year of the analysis is highly skewed to the right with a “fat” and long upper tail, a
feature pointing to the existence of a relatively small number of very well-paid individuals.
This has called into question the use of the traditional Pareto model to properly separate
the group of the rich from poorer workers. The results of fitting a Pareto function to
earnings above some endogenously determined income threshold revealed that this model
is a plausible (if not completely satisfactory) hypothesis for our data. Concomitantly, the
analysis of the shape of the Italian labour income distribution also showed a remarkable
drop of the share of workers in the top quantiles of the 2010 distribution as a result of
the current economic crisis.
Second, in order to shed light on the roots of the labour income inequality, we have
carried out a nested decomposition of the Theil inequality measure that emphasized the
twofold role played by sources of labour income and their distribution among the groups
of rich and non-rich earners.
The results highlighted the decisive role played by self-employment income in shaping
total inequality through positive effects on both between- and within-rich components of
inequality. When viewed alongside the high level of self-employment rate in Italy, this
finding suggests the importance of considering the connection between employment struc-
ture and labour income distribution as a valuable key of understanding. Earnings from
standard employment exhibited positive within-group contributions to overall inequality
due to income disparities among non-rich workers, especially in 2010. These contributions
reflect their large income and population shares among the non-rich, as well as distribu-
tion homogeneity induced by the centralised Italian bargaining system. Atypical earnings
affected inequality negatively in each year, although some positive contributions have
recently arised from the group of the rich.
Finally, the empirical results seem to suggest a preliminary effect on inequality due to
the ongoing economic crisis. Indeed, between 2008 and 2010 self-employed accounted for
a definitely lower income share, relative mean and earnings dispersion that reflected in
weaker inequality contributions. These did not significantly affect total inequality, which
remained almost stable because of the simultaneous increase of the contributions from
standard incomes.
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Appendix: Derivation of the nested decomposition rule
Consider a total distribution of income, Y , and a population of n units (individuals or
households) divided into K mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups27 receiving income
from M different sources, Y m, such that
Y =
n∑
i=1
yi =
K∑
k=1
nk∑
i=1
yik =
K∑
k=1
nk∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
ymik ,
where ymik is the amount of Y m received by the unit i of group k28. Given the Theil
well-known formula
T (Y ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
µ
ln
yi
µ
,
a nested decomposition rule can be derived through the following 3 simple steps (Gi-
ammatteo, 2007).
Step 1. The basic source-based decomposition of the Theil is
T (Y ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
µ
ln
yi
µ
=
M∑
m=1
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ymi
µ
ln
yi
µ
)
=
M∑
m=1
T (m) ,
where ymi is the amount of Y m received by the unit i and T (m) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ymi
µ
ln yi
µ
is the generic pseudo-Theil for the income source m.
Step 2. The standard subgroups decomposition of the Theil index is given by
T (Y ) =
K∑
k=1
piksk ln
µk
µ
+
K∑
k=1
piksk
(
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
yik
µk
ln
yik
µk
)
= Tb (Y ) + Tw (Y ) ,
where piksk = nkn
µk
µ
is the income share of group k. Notice that the first term,
Tb (Y ), contributes nothing only if sk = 1, ∀k; in all other cases it will be
strictly positive. The second term, Tw (Y ), which corresponds to the weighed
mean of the K sub-indices Tk = 1nk
nk∑
i=1
yik
µk
ln yik
µk
, is also never negative and reach
its minimum (zero) only in the case of equally distributed incomes inside each
subgroup of the population.
Step 3. By considering the following additivity in sub-means
µk =
M∑
m=1
µmk , (A.1)
we are able to divide the between-group component of total inequality into M
source contributions as
Tb =
M∑
m=1
(
K∑
k=1
nk
n
µmk
µ
ln
µk
µ
)
=
M∑
m=1
Tb (m) , (A.2)
27Each individual only belongs to one group and the overall population is entirely covered by the K
groups.
28Hereafter, we exclude the trivial case of constant distributions, i.e. Y 6= enµ, where en = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Moreover, for each of the sub-income distribution Y m the following minimum requirement is always
satisfied: ymi ≥ 0, and ymj > 0 at least for one j.
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where nk
n
µmk
µ
is the m source share of total income for the subpopulation k and
Tb (m) =
K∑
k=1
nk
n
µmk
µ
ln µk
µ
is the pseudo-Theil index computed on the K subgroup
means. Following a similar procedure, but considering the individual income
relations yik =
M∑
m=1
ymik instead of (A.1), we can decompose the within-group
component of the Theil index by income sources as
Tw =
M∑
m=1
[
K∑
k=1
piksk
(
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
ymik
µk
ln
yik
µk
)]
=
M∑
m=1
Tw (m) , (A.3)
where Tw (m) =
K∑
k=1
pikskTk (m) is a weighted sum of K pseudo-Theil indices
Tk (m) =
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
ymik
µk
ln yik
µk
.
Expressions (A.2) and (A.3) allow us to derive the following subgroup-source nested
decomposition of the Theil index
T (Y ) = Tb+ Tw =
M∑
m=1
Tb (m) +
M∑
m=1
Tw (m) ,
where Tb (m) and Tw (m) represent, respectively, the contribution to between- and within-
group inequality coming from the m income component.
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Tables
Table 1 – Sample statistics
Wave
2005 2006 2008 2010
Obs 15,868 16,475 15,299 16,587
Pop. (’000) 21,570 22,619 22,970 22,434
Min 472 231 293 286
p25 11,802 11,094 11,131 10,876
Med. 14,612 14,458 15,042 14,698
p75 18,597 18,574 18,953 18,519
Max 236,035 288,906 392,284 383,305
Mean 17,967 17,182 17,403 17,126
St. dev. 16,786 15,195 18,732 18,869
Skewnessa 5.97 6.87 9.10 10.47(<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)†
Kurtosisb 55.87 82.81 121.91 160.36(<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)† (<5e-05)†
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data
Notes
a Numbers in round brackets: p-values for the D’Agostino (1970) skewness test; the null hypothesis is
H0: normality versus the alternative H1: nonnormality due to skewness
b Numbers in round brackets: p-values for the Anscombe and Glynn (1983) kurtosis test; the null
hypothesis is H0: normality versus the alternative H1: nonnormality due to excess kurtosis
† Significant at the 0.1% level
Table 2 – Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit test for the Pareto distribution fita
Wave m∗ xˆ∗min αˆ
∗
H Dmin
b
2005 3,291 19,925 1.962 0.061(4.673)† (57.706)† (0.906)
2006 3,345 19,946 2.225 0.069(3.898)† (58.553)† (0.920)
2008 3,512 18,953 2.239 0.061(6.407)† (58.921)† (0.926)
2010 1,083 28,612 1.916 0.074(4.453)† (33.034)† (0.952)
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data
Legend : m∗ = optimal number of observations in the upper tail to be used for estimation of the
shape parameter; xˆ∗min = optimal estimate of the lower income limit; αˆ
∗
H = optimal estimate of the
shape parameter; Dmin = minimum value attained by the K-S statistic
Notes
a Numbers in round brackets: t-ratios using standard errors estimated by the methods described in
Section 2
b Numbers in round brackets: p-values computed via 5,000 Monte Carlo replications; the null hypothesis
for the test is that the Pareto model is a statistically good approximation to the model generating
the data
† Significant at the 0.1% level
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Table 3 – Summary statistics and inequality measures by population subgroups and in-
come sourcesa
Non-richb Richc Standard Self-employed Atypical Gross inc.
2005d
Pop. share 0.804 0.196 0.648 0.223 0.129 1.000(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) –
Inc. share 0.579 0.421 0.581 0.331 0.088 1.000(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) –
Rel. mean 0.721 2.145 0.897 1.482 0.682 1.000(0.009) (0.034) (0.012) (0.036) (0.016) –
Theil 0.068 0.187 0.090 0.450 0.165 0.249(0.002) (0.017) (0.005) (0.025) (0.012) (0.014)
Gini 0.189 0.303 0.210 0.498 0.295 0.337(0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
2006d
Pop. share 0.807 0.193 0.630 0.189 0.181 1.000(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) –
Inc. share 0.598 0.402 0.598 0.283 0.119 1.000(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) –
Rel. mean 0.742 2.078 0.948 1.497 0.659 1.000(0.009) (0.034) (0.012) (0.043) (0.014) –
Theil 0.068 0.171 0.090 0.414 0.173 0.225(0.002) (0.021) (0.005) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015)
Gini 0.193 0.280 0.211 0.477 0.305 0.323(0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007)
2008d
Pop. share 0.781 0.219 0.640 0.176 0.184 1.000(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) –
Inc. share 0.559 0.441 0.602 0.272 0.126 1.000(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) –
Rel. mean 0.716 2.015 0.941 1.545 0.683 1.000(0.012) (0.039) (0.016) (0.063) (0.020) –
Theil 0.076 0.241 0.097 0.524 0.283 0.270(0.003) (0.028) (0.007) (0.044) (0.050) (0.021)
Gini 0.199 0.307 0.215 0.518 0.332 0.339(0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.017)
2010d
Pop. share 0.930 0.070 0.655 0.182 0.163 1.000(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) –
Inc. share 0.763 0.237 0.644 0.240 0.116 1.000(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) –
Rel. mean 0.820 3.406 0.983 1.320 0.711 1.000(0.011) (0.118) (0.013) (0.048) (0.023) –
Theil 0.092 0.252 0.173 0.480 0.223 0.269(0.002) (0.027) (0.022) (0.041) (0.039) (0.019)
Gini 0.242 0.323 0.274 0.506 0.321 0.337(0.003) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.008)
Source: authors’ own calculations using the PLUS data
Notes
a Figures might not add up because of rounding
b Includes individuals with income < xˆ∗min
c Includes individuals with income ≥ xˆ∗min
d Numbers in round brackets: estimated standard errors
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Figures
Figure 1 – Pareto distribution fit for the PLUS 2005 wave
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Figure 2 – Pareto distribution fit for the PLUS 2006 wave
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Figure 3 – Pareto distribution fit for the PLUS 2008 wave
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Figure 4 – Pareto distribution fit for the PLUS 2010 wave
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Figure 5 – Comparison between 2008 and 2010 Italian labour income distributions: the
mean shift effect
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Figure 6 – Measures of the amount of inequality in the Italian labour income distribution
by population subgroups and income sources
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